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This paper examines the globalization process of German core export metalworking 
industries, to show how the globalization of national corporations has different effects on 
domestic economies. Contrary to the prevalent views on the globalization of production, 
this paper holds that the outcomes and patterns of globalization vary, due mainly to 
the politics of the main actors inside and outside corporations. This paper compares 
Germany’s negotiated globalization with U.S. employer unilateralism. In most U.S. 
corporations, employers decide how to globalize based on the short-term perspective of 
shareholder value. By contrast, in Germany, main industrial actors—including employers, 
works councils, and trade unions—collectively negotiate how to globalize. In this conflict-
laden process of collective negotiation, German actors have created a political compromise 
that combines the upgrading of domestic production with globalizing overseas, whereas 
Americans have failed to do so. Furthermore, this paper emphasizes that divergent 
patterns of globalization are not predetermined by national institutions. To the contrary, 
the successful outcomes in German globalization come mainly from actors’ proactive 
readjustments in their traditional model of industrial relations, creating new practices, such 
as active union involvement in company-level bargaining, and the democratic bottom-up 
process instead of the traditional top-down process of negotiation.
Keywords
globalization of production, negotiated globalization, Germany, U.S. industrial relations, 
co-determination, company-level bargaining
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Recently, corporations in the advanced capitalist countries have increasingly organized 
their production across national borders, as global competition becomes more intense 
and as technologies change more rapidly. In order to survive in this competitive climate, 
corporations tend to dissolve the existing vertically integrated in-house production, 
move parts of production overseas, and recombine various cross-border advantages, 
such as low-wage labor, high-tech parts, and easy access to markets. This globalization 
of production engenders not just changes in the international division of labor, but it also 
dissolves national economic systems. For example, in 2010, German and U.S. automak-
ers produced more cars overseas than at home. Furthermore, as production in Central 
and Eastern Europe has been further upgraded and parallel production has been intro-
duced, the global competition of production sites has become fiercer and more direct.1
Reorganization of production across national borders may improve the competi-
tiveness of corporations, but it can cause many changes to the national economy, 
including the hollowing-out of domestic manufacturing jobs and the deregulation of 
industrial relations. Many scholars as well as the general populace in advanced coun-
tries expect a “race to the bottom” and convergence toward a U.S.-style unregulated 
market due to this competition of production sites.2
Are the advanced economies really converging toward the bottom or a U.S.-style 
uncoordinated market? If an advanced country like Germany has maintained high 
skills and high wages in the process of globalization, how did it accomplish this? By 
examining the German pattern of globalized production in the metalworking indus-
tries, particularly the automobile industry, compared with the U.S. pattern, this paper 
holds that the globalization of production does not inevitably lead to a hollowing-out 
of domestic production or convergence toward a U.S.-style free market. To the con-
trary, the German way of globalization shows an effective alternative that involves 
continuously upgrading its domestic production through collective coordination. This 
paper holds that the different outcomes of globalization are not predetermined by the 
existing institutions, but they have been constituted by different forms of politics 
among the main industrial actors. Although existing industrial relations have signifi-
cantly shifted toward decentralization, Germany can continuously upgrade its domes-
tic production through conflict-laden collective negotiations in contrast to the U.S. 
pattern of unilateral capital decisions. This paper emphasizes that the globalization is 
not a given and singular trend, but it is constituted by the politics of main actors, which 
can lead to very different outcomes for domestic economies.
In order to examine the different national patterns of globalization, this paper focuses 
on the German metalworking industries, particularly the automobile industry. The met-
alworking industries are the backbone export industries in Germany. Their exports in 
2010 reached more than 60 percent of all German exports, or €561.1 billion. Of the 
metalworking industries, the automobile industry is the most important not only in its 
share of total metal turnover (37 percent), but also in its impact on other industries.3 
Furthermore the automobile industry provides an excellent test case of convergence in 
the course of globalization because it is one of the most globalized industries.4
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To explore how German metalworking industries, particularly the automobile 
industry, have globalized differently from their U.S. counterparts, this paper relies on 
interviews with industrial experts and leaders of unions and trade associations, as well 
as employers of German corporations, and review of extensive empirical data gathered 
by German research institutes, such as Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches 
Institut (WSI) and Soziologischesforschung Institut (SOFI). I also updated and supple-
mented the data with extensive secondary literature and German periodicals including 
Böckler Impuls and Wirtschasftswoche.
This paper first examines the prevalent views on globalization, suggesting a theo-
retical alternative before exploring the different methods of globalization. This paper 
then examines how the effects of globalization on domestic economy differ between 
Germany and the United States.
Prevalent Theories and an Alternative
This section briefly reviews the prevalent paradigms for the globalization of produc-
tion, including neoliberal and leftist theories of a converging “race-to-the bottom,” as 
well as path-dependent institutionalism. This section suggests a theoretical alterna-
tive, which focuses on the politics among reflexive actors.
Although neoliberals and pessimistic leftists differ in their evaluations of the effects 
of production globalization on domestic economies, they commonly predict a conver-
gence of national economies toward a U.S.-style liberal market. Neoliberals hold that 
globalization mutually benefits advanced countries and developing countries.5 For 
example, neoliberals hold that the offshoring of information technology (IT) jobs to 
India and the Philippines not only benefits developing countries by creating more jobs, 
but the practice also brings economic benefits to the U.S. economy because it reduces 
labor costs and creates more wealth for the United States. A 2003 McKinsey report says:
Offshoring creates wealth for U.S. companies and consumers and therefore for 
the United States as a whole: that is why companies choose to follow this 
course. Offshoring is just one more example of the innovation that keeps U.S. 
companies at the leading edge of competitiveness across multiple sectors. If it 
did not benefit U.S. businesses, they would not offshore.6
Neoliberals believe that offshoring creates more wealth and creates more jobs at 
home by wrongly assuming that the interests of the company and the national econ-
omy are identical. However, the interests of companies, workers, and the national 
economy are not the same. There is no guarantee that the wealth U.S. corporations 
earn overseas will be reinvested at home to upgrade domestic production and create 
domestic jobs. In particular, as the 2012 special report of Harvard Business Review 
shows, the recent decline of the U.S. economy is mainly due to the destructive offshor-
ing of businesses and faltering investment in domestic research.7
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On the other hand, most of the leftist scholars, as well as national politicians and 
trade unionists, also expect convergence toward the bottom and the Americanization 
of industrial relations, and they fear the negative effects of globalization on their home 
economy.8 They believe that globalization is a threat to advanced countries because 
the globalization of production and the global competition of production sites can lead 
to a race to the bottom by competitive underbidding on work conditions. Thus, Central 
and Eastern Europe are often regarded as the “Trojan horses in the Americanization” 
of Western Europe.9 Wolfgang Streeck and Christel Lane hold that Germany is disor-
ganizing its coordinated economy and converging toward a U.S.-style neoliberal free 
market. Based on his conception of “bazaar” economy, Hans-Werner Sinn expects that 
advanced countries like Germany and France can no longer hold the chains of value-
creation manufacturing in industries such as the automobile industry.10
However, as discussed below, German production has not been hollowed out. To 
the contrary, the core export industries, particularly the automobile industry, sustained 
a high-road model of production and created more jobs at home by upgrading produc-
tion. Indeed, as Streeck holds, German industrial relations have been significantly 
disorganized.11 However, this disorganization is not simply the exhaustion of a coordi-
nated economy; rather, German social actors in the metalworking industries have 
developed a new type of coordination in the course of globalization. This new coordi-
nation method allows Germany to succeed in improving domestic production.
In this sense, readjustments of German industrial relations in the course of global-
ization contradict the path dependence explained by the institutionalists like Hall and 
Soskice.12 German employers have attempted to decentralize industrial relations, 
rather than simply utilizing existing institutions. Although traditional industrial rela-
tions in Germany have been significantly decentralized to company-level bargaining, 
main actors—including works councils, trade unions, and employers—have built a 
new model of coordination practices that include company-level agreements for 
employment and competitiveness (Betriebsvereinbargung für Arbeit und 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit). This new model has created a significantly different pattern of 
globalization, especially when compared with the United States.
In order to examine the dynamic constitution of different patterns of globalization, 
this paper emphasizes the politics among reflexive actors in the process of globaliza-
tion, inspired by Kathleen Thelen’s updated version of historical institutionalism, 
Herrigel’s pragmatist constructivism, and the “micro politics” approach in the multi-
national corporations (MNCs) developed by Peer H. Kristensen and Jonathan Zeitlin.13 
This paper holds that the different methods of globalization result from the conflict-
laden politics among industrial actors—such as works councils, employers, and 
unions—instead of being determined by institutions or by the necessity of a worldwide 
best practice. This position does not argue that institutions do not matter. To the con-
trary, institutions matter greatly in the sense that they provide actors with resources 
and repertoires with which to experiment and create new practices. As shall be exam-
ined later, German institutional elements like codetermination and central unions give 
social actors more leeway than their U.S. counterparts. However, the leeway has to be 
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used constructively. In Germany, existing institutions, including centralized negotia-
tion and codetermination, are being used in a new way by reflexive actors in the course 
of globalization, creating new institutions and patterns of globalization that are differ-
ent from those found in U.S. globalization.
In order to understand these different processes of globalization, this paper empha-
sizes political interactions in the context of domestic institutions. First, employers in 
advanced economies like Germany and the United States tend to use more benchmark-
ing and direct competition among production sites by developing so-called parallel 
production across international production processes. For example, GM and 
Volkswagen developed the same platform strategy in which they produced different 
models of cars from the same platform with the same standardized parts. By doing 
this, they could earn volume advantages as well as flexibility in changes of production. 
Furthermore, they could earn more productivity gains by whipsawing different pro-
duction sites.14 Under the pressure of employers’ globalization strategies, employees 
have different choices: (i) global labor solidarity against the company policy of whip-
sawing, (ii) strategic partnership by company-level bargaining, and (iii) confrontation 
and passive defeat. In Germany, after strategically changing the existing central bar-
gaining processes and proactively utilizing institutional practices like codetermina-
tion, employees are more likely to pursue company-level negotiation and actively 
participate in the company’s decision-making process. German employees are more 
likely to develop company-level agreements for employment and competitiveness. In 
contrast, in the absence of employee access to company decision-making, U.S. 
employees have had little impact on managerial decisions.
Different Globalizations
The actual process of globalization does not necessitate a wholesale exhaustion of 
coordination or a race to the bottom. Although some labor-intensive industries like the 
textile and clothing industries show signs of hollowing-out at home,15 the globalization 
of German core export industries, particularly the automobile industry, has been sys-
temically different from the U.S. German overseas production is less likely to produce 
the effects of hollowing-out at home. This section studies the extent to which the 
effects of globalization on domestic economy differ between Germany and the U.S.
First, we must note that both German and U.S. metalworking industries, including 
automobile and machinery industries, have significantly increased their overseas pro-
duction since the 1990s. For example, overseas production of German automobiles 
grew from 33.2 percent of total passenger car production in 1995 to 52.3 percent in 
2010.16 U.S. automakers including GM and Ford increased their overseas production 
from 48 percent in 2000 to 75 percent in 2010.17 Following the original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs), parts suppliers in both Germany and the United States have 
also rapidly globalized in the last two decades. According to an empirical study in 
2006, approximately 47 percent of German auto parts suppliers had already begun 
overseas production in Central and Eastern Europe.18
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Figure 1 shows the accumulated outflow foreign direct investment (FDI) growth in 
German and U.S. transport equipment and machinery industries (International 
Standard Industrial Classification codes version 3 ISIC 29 for manufacture of machin-
ery, ISIC 34 for manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, and ISIC 
35 for manufacture of other transport equipment). German FDI increased from $20.5 
billion in 1995 to approximately $71.0 billion in 2009, an increase of 245 percent. By 
contrast, U.S. FDI grew from $46.6 billion in 1995 to approximately $117.8 billion in 
2009, a 138 percent increase. Clearly, German overseas production has grown more 
rapidly than its U.S counterpart since the mid-1990s.
Both German and U.S. corporations also increasingly use the platform strategy and 
direct competition of production sites. In the early 1990s when German automakers 
began to increase overseas production in Central and Eastern Europe, they tended to 
develop the vertically complementary method of high-tech car production in the West 
and low-end production in the East.19 However, German automakers like Volkswagen 
adopted the platform strategy and parallel production in the late 1990s, in which dif-
ferent models used the same platform and same parts at different production sites in 
Eastern and Western Europe, as GM did, although German automakers like Daimler 
still use more or less vertical product specialization.20 As production in Central and 
Eastern Europe is upgraded, German companies tend to use benchmarking and direct 
competition of production sites, increasing their departure from the traditional com-
plementary product specialization—low-tech and simple products in the East and 
high-tech products in the West.21
Despite the similar trends of growing overseas production and direct competition of 
production sites, the effects of German globalization on the domestic economy are 
Figure 1. Outward FDI of Transport Equipment and Machinery Industries: Germany vs. U.S. 
Source: OECD statistics database.
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significantly different from those in the United States. First, we note that German 
domestic production and employment has not declined, even with the significant 
growth of overseas production. By contrast, production and employment in U.S. cor-
porations at home has tended to decline as they globalize. Domestic production of 
German passenger cars increased from 4.36 million in 1995 to 5.55 million in 2010, 
while overseas production also rose significantly in the same period. By contrast, as 
seen in Figure 2, domestic production of U.S. cars significantly declined, from 
8.0 million in 2000 to 3.4 million in 2010; meanwhile overseas production increased 
from 7.4 million to 10.0 million in the same period.
Figure 3 shows the divergent development of domestic employment in the German 
and the U.S. metalworking industries including transportation equipment and machin-
ery industries (version 3 ISIC 29, ISIC 34, and ISIC 35). German domestic employ-
ment in the metalworking industries grew from 2.11 million in 1998 to 2.46 million in 
2008, an increase of 16 percent. In contrast, U.S. employment in the same industries 
declined from 3.55 million in 1998 to 2.76 million, a fall of 22 percent.
Growth of German production and employment in the core metalworking indus-
tries is due mainly to the continuous upgrade of domestic production by further invest-
ment at home and further training of domestic labor. As German corporations have 
increased their overseas production, the domestic job profiles have significantly 
changed. According to many empirical studies, in Germany more high value and 
R&D-related jobs have been created, while low-skilled and low-wage jobs have been 
lost.22 According to an empirical study on employment changes in the German auto-
mobile industry, the jobs of unskilled white-collar workers (Ungelernte Angestellte) 
Figure 2. Domestic and overseas production of U.S. automakers GM and Ford.
Sources: OICA (Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles; International  
Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers) statistics.
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declined between 1996 and 2001 by 55 percent. By contrast, the number of skilled 
workers (Facharbeiter) increased significantly by 16 percent in the same period.23 
Particularly in the German auto parts companies that have taken over more production 
jobs due to the worldwide trend of outsourcing and flexible production, the number of 
skilled workers increased by 64 percent. In addition, in automobile corporations, the 
number of highly qualified white-collar jobs (Qualifizierte Angestellte), mainly con-
cerned with management and R&D, increased by 94 percent. Between 1995 and 2002, 
employees in the R&D jobs of the German automobile industry increased to 77,000, a 
growth of 50 percent. The German automobile industry invested approximately 7 to 
8 percent of annual sales, on average, in product innovation.24 Due to the continuous 
growth of skilled labor, the proportion of skilled employees in the German automobile 
industry reached 78.6 percent of total employment in 2008 (65.3 percent with voca-
tional training (mit Berufsausbildung) and 13.3 percent with technical college certifi-
cates (Fachhoch-und Hochschule-abschluss)), while the proportion of unskilled 
workers (ohne Berufsausbildung) was only 16.6 percent.25
In contrast to this German profile, the proportion of blue-collar workers employed 
in the U.S. automobile industry was relatively constant at 80 percent between 1980 
and 2004. In contrast with the shift in the German employment structure—in which 
the proportion of unskilled white-collar workers declined while the proportion of 
R&D-related jobs increased—the loss of working jobs in the U.S. automobile industry 
has not been compensated by the growth of R&D jobs.26
According to the National Science Foundation’s R&D intensity data, the R&D 
intensity of the U.S. automobile industry (North American Industry Classification 
Figure 3. Employment Changes in Transport Equipment and Machinery Industries:  
Germany vs. U.S.
Source: ILO database.
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System codes NAICS 3361-3363 for motor vehicles and parts) was just 2.5 percent of 
total sales, while the R&D intensity of the whole manufacturing sector in the United 
States was 3.6 percent on average in 2003 (NAICS 31-33). The reason for the rela-
tively modest growth of R&D investment in U.S. manufacturing as a whole is due 
mainly to U.S. offshoring. According to NSF data, U.S. manufacturing corporations’ 
investment in R&D outside the United States grew at almost three times the domestic 
investment in R&D from 1999 to 2007. For the U.S. automobile industry, the value-
added activities inside the United States declined by 16.6 percent between 2000 and 
2007.27 By contrast, in its process of globalization, the German automobile industry 
increased its domestic production by increasing premium car production.28 Due to the 
U.S. way of globalization, in which corporations search for low costs across national 
borders to earn short-term gains rather than upgrading domestic production, the 
national trade deficit has increased. Even in “advanced technology products,” the bal-
ance of U.S. trade, which was in surplus from 1988 to 2002, has turned negative since 
2002 and increasingly has declined to -$53.6 billion in 2007.29
Politics of Globalization: The German  
Way Compared with the United States
In the past two decades, German corporations have upgraded their domestic produc-
tion while moving some aspects of production overseas. German corporations have 
used collective deliberation and coordination to decide how the industries would 
globalize. In the United States, however, employers—who are concerned with share-
holder values—tend to decide globalization strategies unilaterally. In order to under-
stand the different patterns of globalization, this paper emphasizes the politics of 
reflexive actors who reinterpret the meaning of institutions and utilize them in a new 
way in the process of political interaction. This section examines how actors in the 
German metalworking industries have created new practices through their interactions 
in the course of globalization. In order to explore the German way of globalization, 
this section examines (i) the changes of mass producers’ international division of labor 
and labor’s response using the case study of Volkswagen (VW); and (ii) the company-
level pacts in the metalworking industries as a whole.
Changes in the International Division of Labor and Labor Politics
In order to explore how German labor has responded to the competition of production 
sites, the case of Volkswagen is instructive because it is closer to the model of U.S. 
mass producers. Traditionally, German automakers developed “complementary prod-
uct specialization” for the international division of labor with high-end models pro-
duced in Germany and low-end models made in the plants on foreign soil. In 
particular, German premium car makers like Daimler have traditionally emphasized 
each plant’s specialization, called “a solitary factory conception,” in which one plant 
produces one model and does not share components. Each plant feels relatively little 
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pressure from other production sites. Although recently Daimler has adopted some 
parallel production and increased competition of production sites, it still uses a more 
or less vertical specialization.30 However, Volkswagen adopted the platform strategy 
and parallel production, which shared common parts and brought more direct compe-
tition of production sites between Germany and East Europe, as GM did in the 
1990s.31 How did German labor respond to the VW strategy of globalization?
German labor attempted to find an alternative to the global strategy through collec-
tive negotiation at the company level, rather than simply opposing the employers’ 
global strategy. Works councils (Betriebsräte) as shop-floor organizations represent-
ing workers, which have access to the company’s key decisions due to German code-
termination law, in fact agreed with the concept of globalization to enhance the 
company’s competitiveness. Facing the economic crisis of 1993, VW works councils 
changed their existing defensive policy in response to globalization. These works 
councils agreed with employer plans of platform strategy and globalization, and they 
developed a so-called Employment and Modernization Pact.32 In this pact, works 
councils agreed on the rationalization of production methods and the company agreed 
on employment protection. In addition, VW works councils attempted to extend their 
interest representation to foreign laborers in an attempt to extend to them codetermina-
tion over various issues, including global sourcing and work-time flexibility.33
Around 1999, when the company was about to decide where to produce its SUV 
Touareg, globalization became an increasing threat to works councils at Volkswagen. In 
the selection of production sites for high-quality SUVs, severe conflicts between the 
company and labor lasted several months.34 Until that time, a rough consensus at VW 
was that high value-added cars would be produced in Germany and low-priced cars 
would be produced in Central and Eastern Europe. Labor at VW expected that the pro-
duction of SUVs would go to Hannover. However, the Hannover plant could not meet 
the production cost requirements that VW management suggested. From the employer’s 
point of view, the production of SUVs should be more cost competitive in order to com-
pete effectively in the crucial U.S. market. VW labor representatives worried whether 
they would ever get another chance at a new model if they lost such high-tech car pro-
duction. When management would not budge, the labor representatives in Germany con-
ceded Touareg production to the Bratislava plant in Slovakia; but in exchange, they 
began new negotiations for development of a specific car production project to employ 
more workers in Germany. That agreement is the “Benchmark Production 5000X5000.”
Few cases have attracted as much public attention as VW’s project organized as 
Auto 5000 GmbH. From its initial creation all the way through its successful integra-
tion of Auto 5000 employees into Volkswagen AG in January 2009, the project has 
been closely watched. Against the background of debate over Germany as a produc-
tion site, in which neoliberals doubted the existing German model of production based 
on “rigid” collective bargaining and high labor costs, the Auto 5000 project was a test 
case of whether Germany could hold its place in manufacturing.35
In response to the production competition, Auto 5000 GmbH was established to 
produce the Touran minivan in Wolfsburg in August 2001 by collective agreement 
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among key actors including VW management, IG Metall, and VW works councils. 
The Touran initially had been planned for production in Eastern Europe. Key actors 
negotiated not only the wage bargain but also how to organize production. Reflecting 
upon the interests of Lower Saxony’s state government, all workers for Auto 5000 
were recruited from the unemployed, including 3,500 unemployed people who had no 
experience in auto production. Following six months of training, workers began to 
produce the Touran in November 2002.
The wages of Auto 5000 GmbH are the same for all direct workers and are set at the 
level of skilled workers’ average wages defined by the sectoral wage agreement 
(Metall-Flächentarifvertrag) in Lower Saxony, but these wages were initially 20 per-
cent lower than the level for VW workers, as defined by the VW house agreement 
(Haustarifvertrag). Due to the economic success of the Touran, bonuses and wages 
were raised every year to make up this difference. Based on its economic success, 
Auto 5000 was completely integrated with Volkswagen in January 2009 with the same 
wage level as the rest of Volkswagen.
Auto 5000 achieved economic success due to its highly innovative production 
organization. According to a midterm evaluation by the Sociological Research Institute 
(SOFI) at Georg-August University in Göttingen in 2004, Auto 5000 had already made 
large profits as well as significant improvement in quality and production. This eco-
nomic success was not simply due to early wage concessions, compared with VW 
house agreements. More important was the innovation of production organization. For 
example, in 2005, wages did not change but profits grew by 25 percent. Auto 5000 
continuously improved the competitiveness of its production by focusing on process-
oriented innovation.36
A key feature of Auto 5000 production is the continuous improvement of produc-
tion processes by collective deliberation, which utilizes the unused potential of all 
relevant employees. Workloads and personnel deployment are collectively decided by 
management, works councils, and work teams. Production processes are continuously 
optimized through horizontal and vertical communication.
Another key feature of Auto 5000 is an emphasis on “learning plants” (Lernfabriken). 
First, Auto 5000 developed a high level of initial and ongoing training. Based on col-
lective agreements between company and union, workers engage in further training 
three hours per week—a uniquely high level in the automobile industry. Furthermore, 
Auto 5000 systematically integrates work and learning. Auto 5000 has built large con-
ference rooms near the production lines, in which the relevant managers, engineers, 
and specialists from various vocations meet to discuss continuous improvement in 
production. This collective deliberation directly affects continuous improvement in 
workers’ competence as well as finding new efficiencies in the production process.
Due to its economic success and significant improvement on productivity and qual-
ity, VW management decided to give the production of a new SUV Tiguan to Auto 
5000, which began production in August 2007. Auto 5000 empirically demonstrates 
that even high-wage Germany can increase manufacturing jobs, even with strong 
unions and collective negotiation that neoliberals criticize as no longer relevant. In 
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particular, as shall be examined later, VW’s 5000 project has been used as an effective 
alternative model for the German metalworking union IG Metall’s strategy, allowing 
unions to be actively involved in company-level bargaining and suggesting an alterna-
tive to employers’ production relocation.37 For example, in the 2008 economic crisis, 
IG Metall attempted to expand VW-style codetermination and cooperative solutions to 
the suffering Opel and small and medium-sized companies like Schaeffler.38
The case of Audi engine production in Györ, Hungary, also shows the most recent 
and direct competition of production sites between Germany and Central and Eastern 
Europe. Until the early 1990s, VW engines were produced in Salzgitter, Germany, and 
Audi engines were made in Ingolstadt. However, since 1994, when Audi built and 
upgraded its engine plant in Györ, the international division of labor began to change 
slowly. In 2000, Ingolstadt finally stopped producing engines, while Salzgitter reduced 
production.39 A SOFI industrial expert succinctly described the upgraded production in 
the Eastern Europe and the intense competition between Eastern and Western Europe:
At this moment, the complementarity is not so clear. The East production sites 
learned a lot in the last 15 years; it may not be a competition between East and 
West, but a competition between Western companies located at East and com-
panies located at West.40
Nevertheless, German production sites for Volkswagen did not reduce employment 
as a result of company-level collective bargaining. Through collective compromise, 
German sites improved their production. Although Ingolstadt conceded the engine 
production to Györ, it did not reduce its employment levels. Through collective agree-
ment, Audi restructured the production system, and surplus employees in Ingolstadt 
were redeployed to car assembly. In actuality, employment in Ingolstadt increased 
from approximately 22,400 in 1994 to just over 31,000 in 2003, two years after the end 
of engine production.41
Salzgitter also sustained employment levels and improved its production through 
company-level pacts in 1999, 2001, 2004, and 2006. While Salzgitter reduced the num-
ber of semi-skilled workers, it increased skilled workers by 80 percent, due to a focus 
on higher-value parts for engines.42 In 2006, VW developed another company-level 
pact for the Salzgitter plant in which the company agreed to invest in the development 
of a new generation of engines and employ 7,000 more workers; meanwhile labor rep-
resentatives agreed to extend the work week from 28.8 hours to 33 hours without fur-
ther compensation.43 These agreements show that through collective deliberation, main 
actors in German companies tend to change the international division of labor from 
traditional product specialization to specialization in production of high-value parts.
Company-level Pacts in the Metalworking Industries
The different outcomes of globalized production mainly arise from the different ways 
of globalization. The reason why the German automobile industry improved their 
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domestic production and employment—even in the course of internationalization—is 
because of the collective deliberation among key actors, including employers, unions, 
and works councils that together created company-level pacts for competitiveness and 
employment. These company-level pacts are not limited to VW; they are widespread 
in the German core industries. This section examines first the extent to which such 
company-level pacts have developed, and then explores how Germans formed the 
company-level pacts in the course of globalization.
First, we note that German company-level agreements were newly created in a conflict-
laden process of adjustments. In 1993, when Volkswagen made a company-level agree-
ment for employment, such agreements were exceptional in Germany. However, 
company-level alliances for employment and competitiveness have now become common 
across industries in Germany, increasing especially since the 2004 Phorzheim Agreement.44 
As seen in Figure 4, the number of company-level agreements in the metalworking and 
electronics industries increased annually, from seventy in September 2004 to 730 in April 
2009. According to recent IG Metall data, a total of 3,408 deviation agreements were 
forged between 2004 and March 2010. Many deviations agreements have now expired, 
and in 2010 approximately 1,060 agreements remained in effect.45
Company-level agreements for employment and competitiveness reflect political 
tradeoffs based on the principle of reciprocity.46 It is difficult to measure the degrees 
of tradeoff in the exchanges because company-level agreements vary case by case. 
However, despite the variations in company-level pacts, as seen in Table 1, German 
employers in the metalworking industries have provided many counter-concessions 
including employment protection, further investment, and innovation in exchange for 
labor concessions on work-time flexibility and pay, even though labor organizations 
Figure 4. Number of Company-level Deviations from Sector Agreements in Metal and 
Electronics industries.
Source: Gesamtmetall
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were on the defensive during the course of globalization. For example, in the three 
years between 2004 through 2006, employers in the German metalworking industries 
provided investment promises of more than €3 billion in the derogation agreements. 
The promise of innovation and further training contributed to the upgrading of domes-
tic production competitiveness. More importantly, as seen in Table 1, employers’ 
counter-concessions show strong increases across all issues except for bonuses for 
union members. This is one instance in which labor representatives in Germany have 
controlled the deviations and earned more influence in company-level bargaining.
These advances on the part of labor do not mean that German employers have lost 
power. German employers likewise have an interest in upgrading their production 
sites. For example, even in the metalworking industries, works councils at small com-
panies (SMEs) have fewer organizational resources and competencies than large cor-
porations to develop company pacts. Nevertheless, German SMEs have strong 
incentives to maintain and upgrade domestic production, because they believe that 
their competitiveness is based on the abundance of skilled engineers as well as the 
regional networks among neighboring specialist companies, universities, and research 
institutes, such as in Baden-Württemberg and Bayern.47
The collective deliberation and commitments to upgrading domestic production in 
Germany contrast with the U.S. model of unilateral decisions to globalize based on cor-
porate financialization. Many U.S. business and industrial experts, including Michael 
Porter, Thomas Kochan, and Gregory Tassey, diagnose the causes for the current decline 
of U.S. industrial competitiveness as low investment and destructive offshoring due to 
employers’ short-term horizons.48 Due to shareholder activism, stock-based incentives, 
and declining managerial tenure, U.S. employers who are concerned with “this quarter’s 
numbers” are tempted to “move business activities to whatever location offers the best 
Table 1. Employer Counter-Concessions according to the Issues in Derogation Agreements 
in Metal and Electronics industries.
Unit: % of companies
Years 2004 2005 2006
Employment Protection 61.7% 73.8% 79.7%
Protection Production Sites 16.8% 21.1% 31.4%
Investments 10.2% 24.8% 33.9%
Innovation / Competition 8.4% 9.5% 15.1%
Apprenticeship 12.0% 21.4% 28.0%
Further Training 4.8% 8.3% 16.6%
Codetermination / Union Rights 31.1% 33.5% 40.5%
Bonus for Union Members 9.0% 7.7% 5.9%
Others 41.3% 49.3% 59.8%
Source: Haipeter (2011), 39; Haipeter and Lehndorff (2009), 39; Bispinck and Dribbusch (2011), 42.
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deal today rather than make the sustained, location-specific investments required to 
boost long-run productivity.”49 In particular, Kochan rightly points out the power shift 
within U.S. corporations due to corporate financialization:
The focus on maximizing shareholder value and an easy-come, easy-go attitude 
toward the workforce started during the 1980s. Corporations were increasingly 
seen as bundles of tradable assets that could be reconfigured or restructured to 
maximize short-term financial returns. Power within corporations shifted from 
leaders responsible for production, human resources, and labor relations to 
finance executives, who served as agents of ever more demanding financial 
markets.50
In the United States, even the strong auto unions have focused on defending their 
members’ interests on issues such as severance payments, instead of trying to upgrade 
production sites through collective deliberation as Germans have done. Due to the 
inability of employees to access the company’s decision-making processes, U.S. 
unions are more likely to protest against employers’ unilateral decisions on globaliza-
tion, or to lobby members of Congress, than to develop cooperative solutions for 
upgrading their production sites.51
However, this does not mean that the United States completely lacks institutional 
resources to develop collective deliberation. Recently, under the current economic crisis, 
the Obama Administration intervened in the process of rescuing and reshaping indus-
tries. It reorganized top management in the financially troubled auto corporations and 
provided guidelines for corporate restructure. In addition, the government has initiated 
public funding to rejuvenate high-technology innovation and U.S. manufacturing. 
Indeed, the U.S. government has a long history of industrial policies that have developed 
high-tech industries, such as computers and biotechnology.52 However, as Fred Block 
argues, public funding initiatives and industrial policies have been hidden from public 
deliberation due to the predominance of market fundamentalism, which has reduced the 
effects of industrial policies as well as prevented collective deliberation of industrial 
policies.53 In the current crisis, the Obama Administration’s industrial policies may cre-
ate a chance to change this trend. However, it is too early to tell whether Obama’s open 
industrial policies can create socially deliberative U.S. corporate governance. It depends 
on domestic politics, as seen in Germany, which shall be examined now.
How were Germans able to develop collective deliberation and company-level 
pacts in the course of production globalization? In taking a pattern quite different from 
U.S. unilateralism, the German case confirms that institutions matter. German institu-
tions, including strong industry unions, works councils, and codetermination—lacking 
in the United States—provided actors with significant resources in forming company-
level cooperative pacts, even though many German corporations have also shifted to 
corporate financialization, departing from their traditional corporate governance.
For example, Daimler AG has deviated from the typical German corporate gover-
nance model and has increasingly depended on financial markets since the late 1990s 
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when it merged with Chrysler. Traditionally Daimler had a stable block of sharehold-
ers, such as Deutsche Bank. Likewise, Volkswagen has the government of Lower 
Saxony (20 percent of total shares), and BMW has the Quandt family. However, as 
Deutsche Bank has changed to a shareholder-value financial operation and retreated 
from Daimler’s shares, Daimler’s top management might lose the ability to implement 
a coherent long-term strategy.54 However, despite the changes in financialization, 
Daimler is still under the influence of German codetermination, by which employee 
representatives can participate in the key decision of the corporation. Due to this insti-
tution of codetermination, Daimler workers were able to deliberate on the company’s 
economic crisis and build company-level pacts in 2004 and 2012 in response to the 
company’s threat of relocation.55
Indeed, the German institution of codetermination has facilitated the building of 
these company-level alliances, as seen in the case of Daimler. Due to access to com-
pany decision-making through codetermination, German labor representatives are 
more likely to develop company-level cooperative alliances as a solution to global 
competition of production sites.56 For German labor, developing international solidar-
ity among unions against their multinational corporations’ whipsawing strategy is the 
second-choice option they use in situations where they do not have access to the com-
pany’s decisionmaking and their employers reject collaboration.57 In this sense, the 
German policy of codetermination has facilitated company-level alliances.
However, we note that company-level agreements in the process of globalization are 
not wholly predetermined by German industrial relations institutions. On the contrary, 
reflexive actors created such agreements, freshly interpreting the meaning of institu-
tions and creating new understandings in the process of political interaction. Rather 
than passively resisting the decline of existing centralized institutions, German labor 
proactively changed the meaning of decentralization and utilized the unused potential 
provided by codetermination in the process of political conflicts with employers.
Traditionally, the German model of industrial relations had been characterized by 
the dual system in which collective negotiations about wages and working time 
occurred between unions and employer associations, such as IG Metall and 
Gesamtmetall at the industrial level, while works councils normally supervised the 
implementation of the collective agreement at the company level.58 However, com-
pany-level agreements, which became popular in the process of globalization, are 
deviations from the existing centralized agreements, and strengthened the trend of 
decentralization in collective bargaining. Many scholars, including Wolfgang Streeck 
and Anke Hassel, argue that this decentralization represents a disorganization of the 
German model and a move in the direction of the U.S-style liberal model.59 However, 
the company-level agreements are not a sign of conversion to a free market, but the 
creation of a new form of collective coordination resulting from the conflict-laden 
politics of reflexive actors in Germany.
Initially, German employers attempted to negotiate at the company level, deviating 
from the existing sector agreements. These attempts are contrary to the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) institutionalist expectation of path-dependence in which actors 
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utilize comparative institutional advantages of existing centralized coordination.60 In 
order to meet global competition, companies in Germany needed to make their pro-
duction chains and working conditions more flexible; particularly, small and medium-
sized companies were under intense pressure to reduce their production costs.61
As employers began to withdraw their membership from trade associations in order 
to deviate from the sector agreements, the trade associations introduced a special 
membership status called “Ohne Tarifvertrag” (OT: Without Collective Agreement). 
The OT-status companies in the Gesamtmetall increased from seven in 2006 to eighty-
six in 2010.62 Due to the increase of deviations from sector agreements, the existing 
industrial relations in Germany have been significantly decentralized. Employment 
through sector agreements (Flächentarifbindung) in West Germany declined from 
70 percent of total employment in 1996 to 56 percent in 2010. Similar employment in 
East Germany declined further from 56 percent to 37 percent in the same period.63 The 
number of companies in West Germany covered by the sector agreements declined 
from 8,168 in 1991 to 3,495 in 2010, while the number in East Germany fell from 
1,365 to 218 in the same period.64 Now, the locus of bargaining has shifted from indus-
try level to company level. Furthermore, in company-level bargaining, the works 
councils have taken over more tasks than they performed in the past.
Indeed, as globalization goes, German employers have more room to maneuver 
than they had in the days of the traditional coordinated market economy, because they 
can relocate production to other countries or outsource production to other firms with 
different labor norms. However, the decentralization of collective bargaining has not 
resulted in the exhaustion of collective coordination, as Wolfgang Streeck expects.65 In 
the backbone sector of German industrial relations, the decentralization processes 
have been more collectively regulated, with new forms of coordination emerging.
In Germany, trade unions and employer associations have collectively coordinated 
and regulated the scope of deviations, as well as the procedures of company-level dero-
gation negotiation. For example, in 2004, IG Metall and Gesamtmetall forged the 
Phorzheim Accord which officially allowed company-level derogation if the company 
would meet certain conditions, including (i) that the derogations would be temporary 
and should guarantee employment security, and (ii) that the company should make 
further investments in modernization for competitiveness.66 Although the agreement 
was to some extent enforced by government, the Phorzheim Accord enabled trade 
unions and employer associations to centrally control the process. These company-
level changes have further decentralized collective bargaining, but do not imply a sim-
ple exhaustion of coordination or the end of sector negotiations.
By proactively utilizing decentralization and codetermination, rather than passively 
resisting the decline of the existing centralized bargaining, German labor created new 
solutions to the challenges of globalization. Traditionally, German unions were less 
likely to be directly involved in company-level bargaining. In actuality, German 
unions opposed company-level bargaining because they believed it could decrease 
their corporatist coordination capability.67 However, German unions turned to a more 
active involvement in company-level bargaining and created better solutions by 
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developing new practices, such as unions’ active involvement in company-level bar-
gaining and democratic participation of workers in collective negotiation.
Through active involvement in company-level negotiations, German labor in the 
metalworking industries not only upgraded their production sites but also improved 
their organizational power. Company-level negotiation processes in German compa-
nies operate in the following way. First, employers’ interests in negotiating deviations 
from the existing agreements are directly communicated to the union; the union deter-
mines when to pursue company-level negotiation after researching the economic con-
ditions of the company. Negotiation at the company level occurs with participation of 
trade union representatives and during the negotiation, the workers’ assembly contin-
ues to negotiate and communicate. Finally, the negotiation is approved and registered 
in the deviation agreements.68
In this process of bargaining, works councils have gained more influence. Works 
councils attempt to ascertain the company’s economic conditions with the assistance 
of the union after employers submit to their sector unions the reports that justify their 
needs for company-level deviation from existing agreements. Through in-depth inves-
tigation of the employers’ reports, unions and works councils develop their alternative 
solutions. In addition, unions and works councils encourage ordinary workers to get 
involved in the negotiation process as a way to earn more legitimacy for their alterna-
tive to the employer’s plan. This bottom-up democratic legitimation process is not 
only a departure from the traditional German corporatist top-down practices, but it is 
also a key means to recovering union power. Actually, according to an industrial expert 
of company-level bargaining, the level of unionization in the German metalworking 
industries has slightly improved, or at least the outflow of members has been staunched, 
due to the unions’ new policy of aggressive involvement in company-level bargaining 
and this new democratic legitimation process.69
Further, in the conflict-laden processes of company-level negotiations, employers 
and labor representatives have built many constructive and cooperative solutions for 
upgrading German production sites. In the process of company-level bargaining, IG 
Metall’s campaign of “besser statt billger” (better rather than cheaper) has worked as 
an alternative to employers’ solution of offshoring to achieve the lowest price, and it has 
facilitated employer efforts to upgrade domestic production for innovative technology 
and organization. For example, according to an in-depth empirical study by the Instituts 
Arbeit und Qualifikation (IAQ) of sixteen German establishments, works councils 
developed active alternatives to managements’ cost-reduction programs.70 In particular, 
the IG Metall NRW’s besser statt billiger has now become an apparent alternative 
movement in German metalworking industries. Under the strategy of besser statt bil-
liger, works councilors exchange their experiences and contact experts and consultants 
to discuss various issues and find better solutions. The works councils collect employ-
ees’ new ideas and develop innovation in products and production organization.
As seen in Table 2, the insiders in the German companies evaluate their experi-
ences of cooperative works through company-level negotiations very highly. A 
majority of supervisory board staffs in German companies agree that codetermination 
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Table 2. Evaluation on Codetermination and Collaboration in German Corporations.
Agree (yes) Disagree (no) No answer
In the supervisory board*
 Does the participation of various groups in the 
supervisory board contribute to the efficient 
implementation of decisions?
70.3% 29.7% -
 Is the supervisory board successful in 
bringing the interests of capital and labor 
representatives to agreement?
88.2% 11.8%  
Managers’ Evaluation on Collaboration**
 Works councils bring suggestions actively 69% 31% -
 Works councils carry out reorganization 
together
84% 16% -
 Evaluation on collaboration at the 
establishment
(good) (bad) (so/so)
 Executive Directors 72% 4% 24%
 Works Councils 67% 7% 26%
Source: WZB January 2005; Impuls 2/2005; BISS 2006; Impuls 8/2006, p. 2.
*WZB 2005 survey of the supervisory boards of more than 100 companies.
**Bochum University 2006 survey of senior executives of 3,200 establishments and 1,400 workers.
brings efficiency and improvement to their company; 69 percent of executive direc-
tors agree that their works councils bring better ideas to the improvement of produc-
tion; and 72 percent of executive directors evaluate their experiences of collaboration 
as good or very good. In actuality, many empirical studies reveal that company-level 
agreements in the metal and electronics industries significantly contributed to the 
improvement of the company innovation process, creating more jobs and securing 
employment places.71 For example, according to the WSI 2008-2009 special survey 
of 1699 German establishments, these establishments undertook innovation in the 
last two to three years as follows: 70 percent participated in the innovation of opera-
tional processes, 36 percent undertook innovation in product-related services, and 
32 percent made product innovations.72
As a result, through company-level negotiations, employers in the German core 
industries have been increasingly engaged in efforts to find new solutions with employ-
ees to improve the competitiveness in German production sites by further investments, 
training, and innovation through company-level agreements, rather than simply relo-
cating or moving production overseas.
Conclusion
The globalization of production has become an established trend in the advanced 
capitalist countries. Driven by intense competition in the global market, corporations 
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in advanced economies tend to recombine elements of production across national 
borders, including low wages, high technologies, skilled labor, and easy access to 
markets. As national corporations globalize to survive or become more competitive, 
they cause significant changes to national economic systems.
However, prevalent theoretical approaches—including the optimistic neoliberalism 
of mutual benefits and the pessimistic leftist explanations of the hollowing-out of 
domestic manufacturing, the race-to-the bottom, and the Americanization of coordi-
nated economies—are not sufficient to understand the current changes in the global-
ization of production. In contrast to the neoliberal optimism of mutual benefits, the 
globalization of national corporations does not necessarily create more jobs and 
national prosperity, as seen in the United States. Although corporations earn profits on 
foreign soil, there is no guarantee that they invest more at home; they can go to another 
foreign location to get even better returns. Still, this does not mean that the globaliza-
tion of production necessarily generates a hollowing-out or the simple exhaustion of a 
coordinated economy, as many pessimists expect. To the contrary, as seen in the case 
of German core industries presented here, globalization can create more jobs at home 
and make the national industries more competitive.
This paper maintains that the different outcomes of production globalization result 
from the politics of main actors inside and outside the corporations. These politics 
decide where to invest and how to manage the international division of labor based on 
various perspectives. As seen in the text, the different outcomes of U.S. and German 
globalization mainly derive from the different methods of decision making on how to 
globalize. In most U.S. corporations, employers, who are more concerned with share-
holders’ value, unilaterally decide how to globalize, excluding their employees’ voices. 
By contrast, in the German core metalworking industries, main actors—including 
employers, works councils and trade unions—bring varying degrees of influence in 
developing collective agreements to the globalization process. In German metalwork-
ing industries, employers and labor representatives have created constructive solutions 
while contesting where to invest and how to globalize.
However, this German pattern of globalization was not predetermined by Germany’s 
domestic institutions; rather, it was newly created by the conflict-laden politics of 
reflexive actors. Indeed, institutions matter in the sense that German institutions—
including strong unions, works councils, and codetermination (which are not suffi-
ciently available in the United States)—provide actors with facilitative resources for 
building collective deliberation. However, the company-level compromises in 
Germany were newly created by reflexive actors who fundamentally changed the 
meaning of existing centralized bargaining and proactively utilized the unused poten-
tial of codetermination, rather than passively resisting the decline of the existing insti-
tutions in the political sphere. As noted above, in response to employers’ strategies of 
company-level deviations and globalization, German labor has not simply opposed 
decentralization and globalization. It created a new form of coordination through new 
practices, including the unions’ active involvement in company-level bargaining, as 
well as new democratic and bottom-up negotiation methods. German institutions, like 
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works councils and codetermination, are crucial in the sense that they provide actors 
with resources and repertoires. However, even more important are the actors’ reflexive 
and creative practices in political interaction.
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